The Code of Hammurabi communicates the centuries-old adage of an “eye for an eye.” In 1941, many countries felt the desire for equal retribution against the Axis Powers, including the United States. The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor not only shocked America, but the surprise assault forced the country’s hand into succumbing to calls to end military neutrality and officially enter World War II. While Uncle Sam quickly ramped up military recruiting, training, manufacturing, and deployments, the country still felt a burning hole that only an operation like Doolittle’s Raid could accomplish.

United States Forced Into World War II

Although World War II began with Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939, the United States refrained from entering the war as a combatant for two years, choosing to provide political and economic support to the Allied Powers. As Japan escalated military operations against China, the United States found itself in active peace talks with Axis Powers to avoid American involvement in another world war.

Peace discussions between the United States and Japan reached a climax in November 1941. The United States’ demand for Japanese withdrawal from China caused peace negotiations to collapse, leading Japan to launch an invasion of Southeast Asia alongside a surprise attack against America’s Pacific Fleet at the naval base of Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.

The resulting attack on December 7, 1941, proved catastrophic for the United States. Japanese torpedoes and aerial bombardments destroyed numerous battleships and nearly 200 aircraft, killing over 2,400 uniformed personnel and civilians. Amidst the remaining chaos of treating thousands of casualties and repairing damaged equipment, President Franklin Roosevelt declared the surprise attacks as a day that would live in infamy, calling on Congress to declare war on the Axis Powers. The attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated that Roosevelt’s efforts to avoid military involvement in the Second World War were in vain, and the American general staff immediately began to plan mobilization and responses to the Japanese attacks.

Preparations for the Raid

Following Pearl Harbor, the United States quickly enlisted thousands of troops, trained units for deployment to North Africa, and prepared naval assets for action in the Pacific. Three months later, many ships damaged at Pearl Harbor were already back in action, but American military leaders were eager to strike the enemy. The United States hoped to attack the Japanese home islands in retribution for the attacks in Hawaii that left thousands dead and dragged the country into war. To accomplish this unlikely feat, Army Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle was tasked with planning a bombing raid against Japanese targets. The experienced aviator handpicked the most talented pilots he knew, many of whom lost close friends at Pearl Harbor.

Doolittle understood that a raid on Japan’s homeland would be inherently high-risk. Without advanced positioning, protection from fighter escorts, or a secure landing zone, the mission likely represented a one-way trip for the pilots daring enough to volunteer. To make the journey, 16 B-25 Mitchell Bombers were equipped with additional fuel cans and stripped of unnecessary weight to allow safe takeoff from American aircraft carriers. Unaccustomed to taking flight with less than 400 feet of runway, Doolittle and his bombing teams practiced hasty take-offs at Eglin Airfield in Florida and honed their skills of guiding flight navigation celestially in the night sky. By April 1942, Doolittle’s raiders were aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet, ready to deliver payloads against the Japanese capital of Tokyo and nearby manufacturing hubs.

Carrying Out the Mission

After weeks of intense preparation, the mission was unexpectedly rushed. Incoming harsh weather conditions risked the bombers’ ability to safely take off from the flight deck of the USS Hornet. Consequently, the raiders took off earlier than anticipated, stretching an already limited maximum flight time. The abrupt change risked the Americans running out of fuel over Japan or the island’s surrounding waters. If they were lucky, the aviators would reach Japanese-occupied China, where they would still have to evade enemy search teams. With Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle personally leading the mission, however, the pilots bravely headed towards their targets.

Doolittle and his entourage of Army pilots successfully bombed several key targets in Japan. Industrial centers in Tokyo and Nagoya were damaged, and secondary effects disrupted the port cities of Yokohama, Kobe, and Yokosuka. While the mission had limited material impact, the operation did fruitfully impart psychological impacts on the Japanese. Before the Doolittle Raid, the Japanese government had promised its people that they would be safe from enemy attack, but the mission revealed both real and perceived vulnerabilities in Japanese defenses.

For the Allied Powers, and particularly in the United States, the raid provided a much-needed boost in morale, satisfying the need for revenge for the attacks of Pearl Harbor and illustrating that successfully it was possible to attack Japan directly. However, while an emblematic victory for the United States, the Doolittle Raid was not without sacrifice; the American airmen soon faced death, injury, and captivity following the bombings.

What Happened to Doolittle’s Raiders?

Out of the 16 pilot crews of Doolittle’s Raid, most landed in Japanese-occupied China. Some, including Doolittle himself, were fortunate to be rescued and evacuated to Allied forces by Chinese citizens and resistance groups. After running out of fuel and crash-landing in a desolate region of China, Doolittle’s escape crossed paths with Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who promptly led Doolittle to safe haven in India. A pair of surviving crew members landed in the Soviet Union, but after a brief internment and lengthy journey home, the pair returned to American soil.

Not all pilot and bomb crews, however, were as fortunate as Doolittle and the other survivors. Several aviators were captured by the Japanese military in China. Some unfortunately perished under harsh conditions by their captors. Three were executed for their part in the raid, and one died from disease amid cruel mistreatments. For their bravery in combat and retribution of Japanese attacks on America, each of the four deceased Army airmen received a posthumous Congressional Medal of Honor, the United States’ highest award for heroism in combat. As the operation’s primary strategist and leader in planning, training participants, and executing strikes during the Raid, Doolittle also received the Medal of Honor. For the United States, the sacrifices of Doolittle’s pilots were necessary in achieving desired outcomes in heightening the war effort, but the operation also led to changes in Japanese military responses at land and sea.

Japanese Retaliation and Strategic Shifts

The Doolittle Raid led to significant changes in Japanese military strategies in 1942. In China, the Japanese Army retaliated by launching the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign to hunt down any remaining American flight crews who crash-landed in China along with any Chinese citizens who helped them evade capture. During the offensive, 180,000 Japanese troops corralled thousands of innocent Chinese families, killing the men and sexually assaulting the women. Additionally, the Japanese Imperial Army poisoned the drinking water of several Chinese villages with cholera, typhoid, and dysentery bacteria. In all, an estimated quarter of a million Chinese citizens perished alongside thousands of slain Chinese soldiers.

At sea, Japan sought to decrease the risk of domestic attacks by extending its defensive perimeter. This expanded posture led to the Battle of Midway in June 1942, one of the greatest Allied victories of World War II at sea. During the intense battle in the middle of the Pacific, the United States Navy, commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz, destroyed four Japanese aircraft carriers and nearly 250 enemy aircraft. The fight represented a significant turn in the tide of the war especially after American troops under the command of General Douglas MacArthur suffered huge losses during the Philippines Campaign.

The Doolittle Raid served as an indirect catalyst for the triumph at Midway, enabling the Americans to seize the initiative in the Pacific Theater. While American officers could not have predicted the war crimes against innocent Chinese citizens that followed the raid, Doolittle’s crews were certainly grateful for their assistance in fleeing an enemy that posed an existential threat to both nations.

Doolittle After the Raid

After leading his namesake raid, Doolittle was promoted to brigadier general and continued contributing to the Allied war effort by commanding some of the Army’s most active aerial units. In North Africa, Doolittle headed the 12th Air Force, where the formation’s air support predicated American landings in Algeria and Morocco via Operation Torch before offering infantry air support in Tunisia. In November 1943, Doolittle took over command of the 15th Air Force, promptly overseeing operations in southern Italy as the Allied Powers gradually gained a foothold in southern Europe.

Doolittle went on to introduce new aerial combat tactics against the German Luftwaffe after taking command of the 8th Air Force in January 1944. Rather than flying in close escorts with bombers, Doolittle allowed his fighters to proactively seek out enemy fighters lying in wait for the bombers. These tactics effectively neutralized German intercepting aircraft and facilitated American dominance of the skies. During one mission in 1944, Operation Big Week, the 8th Air Force and British pilots destroyed nearly 600 enemy aircraft, numerous engine and ball bearing factories, and key transportation routes.

After World War II, Doolittle returned to his civilian career and became an executive at the Shell Oil Company, where he had worked before the war. He remained in the Air Force Reserve, eventually retiring in 1985 with the rank of lieutenant general. Doolittle passed away at the age of 96 in September 1993 and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. Doolittle’s wartime accomplishments are matched by few others, and his role in avenging Pearl Harbor will be forever remembered in the United States.

Facing a formidable Japanese force in occupied Burma in WWII, the British army decided to infiltrate large commando forces behind enemy lines to undermine the Japanese. The brainchild of one of the most eccentric officers of WWII, the Chindit operations caused chaos for the Japanese before they invaded India. They also showcased the prowess of Allied special operations troops and the damage they could cause.

General Orde Wingate

General Orde Wingate was arguably the most eccentric of all the Allied WWII commanders. A graduate of the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich in 1923, General Wingate was strikingly different from other British officers with similar backgrounds. As a young officer in Mandatory Palestine, he organized small units of Zionist fighters to fight Arab rebels, acting against the British authorities who were seeking to limit Jewish migration to Palestine. This was the first time he practiced asymmetric warfare, which he would promote for the rest of his military career. His successes led to his promotion to major but also led to him being transferred away.

After the outbreak of the Second World War, he did not participate in any fighting for the first two years. When the Allies invaded Italian-controlled Abyssinia in 1941, he worked closely with Ethiopian leader-in-exile Haile Selassie. He organized small bands of British and Ethiopian fighters to harass Italian troops behind their lines. Even though the operation was successful, he contracted malaria and ran afoul of his superiors, who disdained his blustering ways. Afterward, he was assigned to Southeast Asia Area Command in Burma in 1942.

At this point, the Allied campaign in Burma was not going well. Allied troops had been pushed back by Japanese forces to India. Counterattacks involving frontal assaults against Japanese positions in the Arakan region failed. Behind Japanese lines, there was some resistance by Burmese partisans, but they were not sufficient to pose a major threat to Japanese control.

Planning Operation Longcloth

Allied commanders had two main goals in their campaign in Burma: assist the Chinese Kuomintang and break Japanese imperial control of Southeast Asia. As long as Japanese forces maintained effective control over Burma, Lend Lease supplies to China were threatened. These supplies were crucial for China’s survival. Yet, every effort so far to break through Japanese lines in northern Burma had been stopped. Tokyo committed substantial forces to the region and was in no mood to surrender control. Wingate knew this and believed that other means had to be tested to break Japan’s will to fight in Burma.

General Archibald Wavell was the senior Allied commander in Burma in 1943. Hoping to weaken Japanese forces before the next major battle, he agreed to a plan codenamed Operation Longcloth developed by Wingate and some other officers. The 77th Indian Infantry Brigade would be divided into eight columns of around 500 men each. They would march into Japanese-held territory and engage in hit-and-run raids against enemy forces. Wingate had three battalions at his disposal and they could call on the RAF to provide air support. They would be named the Chindits after the Burmese word chinthe, which means lion.

Wingate’s audacious plan was not unique. In North Africa, British commandos launched raids deep into enemy territory to destroy aircraft on German and Italian airfields. However, the scale of this operation was unprecedented. Wingate took a brigade of conventional soldiers and turned them into a guerilla force. His plan could either succeed brilliantly or fail spectacularly.

Operation Longcloth, 1943

On February 8, 1943, 3,000 Chindits in their respective columns entered Japanese Burma. Each column had radios to communicate with one another and the RAF. They also had mules and horses for resupply. Their initial entry was mostly unimpeded, but they had difficulty crossing the Chindwin River. Different columns ran into each other while some got cut off from the main force due to the dense terrain. Wingate became impatient: he wanted his forces to advance swiftly like he had in Abyssinia but now they were getting bogged down in the jungle.

The Japanese were initially caught off guard. They knew to expect small raids on their forces but now found themselves fighting pitched battles behind their lines with large forces. However, they reacted quickly and moved to stop the Chindit attacks. Guards set up on the Irrawaddy River prevented the British from crossing. They brought up reinforcements to protect their airfields, meaning that the Chindits could not get to them. However, the Chindits were able to destroy some of the Japanese rail lines leading to their forward positions on the Chindwin River, which affected Japanese resupply efforts.

For nearly two months, the Chindits fought repeated battles that saw heavy casualties on both sides. By April, Wingate ordered every column to return. While Wingate’s forces inflicted heavy casualties, it did little to challenge Japanese control of Burma, and the damaged railway lines were repaired within a few weeks. The operation came at a heavy cost to the Chindits, and one-third of them failed to return from Longcloth.

Expansion of the Chindits

Despite the heavy losses and lack of tangible results, Wingate was thrilled with Longcloth’s execution and wanted to repeat it on a grander scale. He was supported by the prime minister, Winston Churchill, who was an enthusiastic proponent of special operations. Wingate believed that a larger operation required more support and he wanted aircraft to play a bigger role. He also hoped to head off the impending Japanese offensive in early 1944 known as Operation U-Go.

In Operation Thursday, six brigades were to be deployed along a series of makeshift bases near the Irrawaddy River to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Wingate also hoped to divert substantial Japanese forces to the area. Instead of marching in, the Chindits would be flown in by a newly formed unit: the 1st Air Commando Group. Colonel Philip Cochran, an American pilot, commanded this formation. He ordered gliders to drop the Chindit brigades onto a series of clearings that could then be turned into airstrips. Instead of being supplied overland, the Chindits would fight like paratroopers and be supplied by the airbridge.

Veterans of Longcloth such as Mike Calvert and Joe Lentaigne were brought in to assist with the planning. The expanded Chindit force now consisted of the 3rd West African Brigade, the 14th, 16th, and 23rd UK Infantry Brigades, and the 77th and 11th Indian Infantry Brigades. Wingate hoped to gain support from Kachin guerillas as well. Cochran had 280 planes and gliders available for operations. He even included 6 prototype helicopters. Operation Thursday was the largest special operation of the entire war.

Operation Thursday, 1944

Operation Thursday began on March 4, 1944, as the first Chindit brigades emplaned in India and began their assault on their assigned landing zones. The 16th marched into Burma while the 77th prepared to assault Landing Zone Piccadilly. Other brigades were to follow suit. The landing at Piccadilly nearly turned into a disaster due to logs in the field, but the drops at both Piccadilly and Broadway proceeded. Upon landing, engineers began preparing defenses in each landing zone for a Japanese attack and built temporary airstrips.

By March 11, nearly 9,000 men, 500,000 pounds of supplies, and about 1,200 mules and 175 ponies were dropped 200 miles behind Japanese lines. Japanese general Renya Mutaguchi prioritized the advance into India and did not want to be distracted by the Chindits. However, he realized that this force posed a threat to his rear and ordered eleven battalions to mass against the Chindits. At this point, the Chindits controlled landing zones White City, Aberdeen, Broadway, Piccadilly, Blackpool, and Chowringhee. Their attack on the town of Indaw failed, but they repulsed several Japanese attacks on their positions. On March 24, General Wingate was killed in an air crash, leaving General Lentaigne in command. As Japanese reinforcements arrived, Chindit casualties mounted and the supply situation deteriorated.

In late March, the 23rd Brigade was reassigned to defend India, weakening the Chindits’ manpower. Air resupply continued, but conditions for the troops were terrible. Several bases, including White City, were closed down. Most Chindit forces were evacuated by April though some elements remained behind near the city of Myitkyina.

The Legacy of the Chindits

At this point, American General Joseph Stilwell took command of Chindit operations and ordered them to fight alongside his mixed Chinese-American force. Using a special forces unit as conventional infantry was a controversial decision that enraged Chindit veterans. The Chindit brigades were involved in the advance into Burma in 1945, although some of them were organized into an air-landing division that would not be deployed during the war.

Both Operations Longcloth and Thursday were derided as a waste of resources by some Allied commanders like General Bill Slim. They saw enormous resources devoted for relatively light and temporary gains. However, Operation Thursday is credited with weakening the Japanese advance towards Dimapor in Operation U-Go. The deployment of air units to assist ground forces was extensively used in the Second World War and the 1st Air Commando Group distinguished itself during Operation Thursday.

The Allied victory in Burma decisively broke Japanese control of Southeast Asia. The Chindit operations were not decisive on their own, but they did play a role in weakening Japan’s grip on the territory. The use of special operations forces in Burma worked hand in glove with conventional forces, as Wingate had intended. This eccentric general, famous for wearing an alarm clock on his belt and addressing his officers naked, did not play a decisive role in winning the war. However, he did play a role in the development of unconventional war doctrines promoted in the US and UK today. The Chindits’ propaganda value outweighed any material costs associated with their operations.

The concept of a citizen militia predates the formation of the thirteen British Colonies in the New World by centuries. However, the role of the citizen soldier evolved significantly on the western frontier of the Thirteen Colonies. A shift towards irregular warfare tactics, the adoption of new weapons, and changes to enlistment terms transformed how the Colonies structured their militias. These shifts eventually evolved into the framework that was adopted by the Continental Congress during and after its struggle for independence from Britain.

Raising the Fyrd

Centuries before British settlers settled in the New World, the kings of Anglo-Saxon England raised the Fyrd in response to threats of invasion. Service in the Fyrd was a legal obligation tied to land ownership, in which the amount of land owned dictated how many men the owner was obligated to contribute to the defense of the realm. This system eventually evolved into what became known as the militia system.

The efficacy of this as a means of national defense was called into question, as kings realized that a more effective way to ensure their security was to create a professional fighting force in the form of a standing army. This development set the stage for heated debates around the loss of individual liberties in a professional army. This debate made its way into the British colonists in North America.

The American Militia System

With the establishment of the Thirteen Colonies, the militia system was employed as a defensive measure against Native American attacks, as well as a means of civic enforcement. Under British rule, there was no unified American national identity, and the individual colonies were responsible for passing their own laws governing how their militia system operated. Virginia was one of the colonies at the forefront of developing a strong militia system. They required all able-bodied free men, typically from the ages of 16 to 60, to be enrolled in their local militia and maintain their own weapons. This system sufficed in Virginia for over a century, as military needs leaned more towards local defensive measures rather than large-scale offensive campaigns.

However, when the booming fur trade took settlers west of the Appalachian Mountains into the Ohio River Valley, Virginia found itself limited by its existing militia doctrine. Enrollment in the militias was a civic duty rather than a professional calling. Muster rolls and training exercises served as more of a festive gathering of friends and family rather than a formal military function. The ranks were decided by social status and resembled more citizen than soldier.

The Virginia Provincial Troops

The western frontier presented itself as a land of opportunity with the potential of riches for those who could lay claim to the land. Many of Virginia’s upper echelon saw this as a viable business opportunity but also saw the new perils that came with venturing further west. These perils could not be left in the hands of the farmers and businessmen that made up the local militias. This realization led to the formation of the provincial system.

Legislation authorized the formation of these provincial troops and payment to those who voluntarily enlisted. This new system allowed for men to enlist for very specific periods of time, often only a few months. In addition, they were required to serve outside of their county. This transition was made with the intention of creating a more disciplined and professional fighting force, but this vision took time to come to fruition as men often deserted and returned home before their enlistment ended.

The Ohio River Valley

One of the men with a financial interest in the frontier was none other than George Washington. As a young land surveyor with experience in the Ohio River Valley, Washington replaced his deceased brother Lawrence Washington in his county militia and was then appointed as Major in the Virginia Provincial troops. His first task as Major Washington came in 1753 when Governor Robert Dinwiddie tasked him with delivering a letter to the French forces at Fort Le Boeuf notifying them that they were encroaching on territory claimed by Virginia.

Although Major Washington’s mission to deliver the letter was more diplomatic in nature, the response led to his first military action. Washington returned to Governor Dinwiddie with the letter from the French stating they would not be vacating the Ohio River Valley. He was immediately ordered to lead the Virginia Regiment, a provincial militia unit, and return to the frontier with the intention of building forts as a defensive measure.

Flaws in the militia system were clear during Washington’s first true military engagement. Washington was given command with no combat experience, and the new militia system that paid men per enlistment attracted many men of lower social standings and questionable moral judgment. Washington’s inexperience and rash decision making led to the surprise attack of a small detachment of French forces during the Battle of Jumonville Glen. Having received reports of a potential ambush from French troops camped in a concealed location off the road, Washington marched his men directly into their encampment and opened fire. This incident ranks high on the list of causes of the American theater of the Seven Years’ War, known as the French and Indian War.

British Reinforcements

Major George Washington was responsible for some disastrous decision-making in the frontier that forced King George II to send reinforcements from the British Army to expel the French. On paper the mission was simple, General Edward Braddock and 2,000 British soldiers crossed the Atlantic and headed west to secure the French occupied Fort Duquesne. However, the mission proved far more difficult when the stubborn British military doctrine encountered the irregular warfare tactics employed in the frontier.

French and Indigenous forces ambushed Braddock and his men as they approached Fort Duquesne, and the inability to adapt to their environment sealed Braddock’s fate as he was shot through the chest. Despite his prior failures in the frontier, Washington and the Virginia militiamen understood how to best fight back against Indigenous tactics by employing irregular tactics of their own. Provincial militiamen were no strangers to the harsh terrain and bloodcurdling cries of attacking Native American warriors and, despite having a reputation for being undisciplined and unreliable, the citizen soldiers held their ground with more courage than their professional British counterparts.

The militia institution that had formerly been composed of unreliable and ineffective farmers and businessmen was now made up of men with real combat experience. They no longer just met their civic duty to serve, but instead they resembled a professional fighting force, instilling even more confidence among the colonists that the citizen soldier was the best military structure.

The Standing Army Debate

While the British were eventually victorious in the Seven Years’ War, the aftermath of the American campaign became a point of contention between the colonists and the Crown. As the seeds of rebellion were cultivated by iconic revolutionaries like Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, the debate over a standing army surged back to the forefront. Resurfacing the works of prominent Whig writer John Trenchard, pamphlets circulated questioning the formation of a standing army versus leaving the fate of the colonies in the hands of the militia system.

Overwhelmingly, colonists preferred relying on the citizen soldier, citing a fear of a standing army as trading one form of tyranny for another. This argument seems logical, as militias were made up of local familiar faces, and a standing army would be composed of soldiers from all different colonies. Even in their joint quest for independence, the thirteen colonies were far from being a single unified nation. This raised concerns over who was in control of the standing army.

Despite these concerns from the general population, on June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the formation of the Continental Army. This new standing army was supposed to be composed of ten provincial militia units under enlistments that resembled the arrangements for the Virginia militia.

Citizen Soldiers and the American Revolution

Initial expectations that the American riflemen would win a swift victory fell short as the Revolutionary War dragged on for years. Some men joined in the Continental Army under the command of now General Washington, while others remained in their local militias. When local militias were called on to bolster the numbers of the standing army, their service often was more a liability than an asset. In traditional field battles, the militias were ill-equipped to go toe-to-toe with the British Army, leading many to break ranks early and making it nearly impossible for Continental leadership to rely on their support.

However, while unreliable and ineffective in traditional settings, the citizen soldier excelled on  the western frontier. The lands west of the Appalachians were in a constant threat of violence as relationships with some Indigenous tribes deteriorated and British-sponsored attacks became more prevalent. The Virginia Provincial militias were tasked with preventing any meaningful British-Native alliance forming a western theater of the Revolution. This event would have proven disastrous to the revolutionary cause if Washington had been forced to spread his forces even thinner by detaching men to the West.

Post-Revolution

As the American colonies celebrated the British surrender at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, many colonies transitioned their militias back to their original posture of being a local defensive and civic enforcement measure. However, the work was not over for Virginia and those serving in the frontier. Native Americans in the west were not party to the terms of the British surrender, and the provincial militias remained the first line of defense in the west.

One major change that Virginia implemented after the American Revolution was the system of military ranks. On the advice of General Washington, local militias were restructured to prioritize military experience over social status when appointing officers. This practice received some pushback by local elites but strengthened the overall effectiveness of the militia system.

Forced to adapt during their service in the western frontier, the system of relying on the citizen soldier evolved from local farmers and businessmen fulfilling their civic duties into a system that resembled a part-time professional fighting force. The refined Provincial troop structure pioneered by Virginia to secure the western frontier thus eventually became the framework for the federalized army.

The island of Haiti has long been subjected to foreign control due to its rich natural resources and its perennial political instability. The US occupation of Haiti in the 20th century was militarily successful and became a case study in counterinsurgency for the American military. The local population resented the American presence and clashed with them repeatedly. The lessons learned by American commanders shaped the American counterinsurgency doctrine for decades to come.

The Assassination of Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam & Arrival of US Troops

Ever since it gained independence from France, Haiti had become accustomed to political turmoil, instability, and meddling from foreign powers. As the United States sought to control businesses and governments throughout the region, it set its eyes on Haiti. America had a standard method when it came to controlling countries throughout Latin America: its businesses coopted local elites, worked with the US military to control infrastructure in the state, and set up local militaries or police forces to do America’s bidding.

In March 1915, Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam became president of Haiti. Sam was close to many American officials and industrialists, who sought to use him to gain more access to Haitian sugar and other raw materials. When people throughout the country protested his rule, he crushed the demonstrations, killing 167 people in the process. This only enraged Haitians more, who believed he would sell the country out to foreigners. In July 1915, he hid in the French legation in the capital while crowds of people attacked the building. They forced him out and killed him in public on July 28, 1915.

Sam’s killing horrified American officials, who worried that Americans living in Haiti were at risk. Woodrow Wilson’s administration advocated liberal interventionism and believed in intervening in countries facing upheaval. He was also concerned that Germany would take advantage to control the island and set up submarine bases there. Therefore, he ordered 330 US Marines and Sailors to reinforce a small Marine outpost already on the island.

The Beginning of the Occupation

Rear Admiral William Caperton, commander of the Cruiser Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet, took command of the American detachments sent ashore. Initially, the 12th Marine Expeditionary Company and some sailors landed and proceeded to take control of areas within the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. They faced resistance from Haitian gunmen opposed to Sam’s government. France also sent a detachment of 50 men to protect its legation in the capital.

In the next month, reinforcements arrived to support Caperton’s force in the form of the 1st Marine Brigade, which consisted of the 1st and 2nd Marine Regiments. By August 12, stability had been regained and Caperton began preparations to hold a new round of elections. American officials hoped to have an ostensibly fair election, but one in which their preferred candidate won. When the election took place, it was closely supervised by the United States and Marine units acted as security for polling sites. The preferred US candidate, Sudre Dartigurnave, was elected on August 12 and in the following month, the United States and Haiti signed a treaty to legitimize the presence of American troops in the country.

For the next two decades, American forces were effectively responsible for the administration of Haiti. Instability was rife due to Dartigunarve’s unpopularity and an American attempt to rewrite the Constitution. The Americans lacked the manpower to patrol the entire country. Therefore, they began to train and arm the Haitian Gendarmerie, a force that would assist US troops in their occupation. 2,500 Haitians became part of this new force that gained a reputation for brutality.

Opponents of the Occupation

The US decision to back Sam’s government and to directly intervene after his assassination enraged a large number of Haitians. Rosalvo Bobo, a popular Haitian politician, had led the uprising against Sam’s administration. When the Americans announced elections, he agreed to run against Dartigurnave. His defeat led to his exile from the country, where he could not effectively lead an opposition against the Americans.

Bobo’s armed supporters, known as the Cacos, were a tough fighting force that sought to resist the Americans the same way the Haitian rebels resisted the French during the War of Independence more than a century earlier. Once he was forced into exile, Bobo was replaced by Charlemagne Péralte, who sought to use any means necessary to force the Americans to leave. Péralte became a legend in Haiti for his defiant actions. As several thousand Haitians joined the Cacos, the Marines had a serious fight on their hands to keep control of the country.

The Cacos drew much of their strength from Haitian peasants in the countryside. There has always been a celebrated tradition of fighting foreigners on Haitian soil and the American occupation was no different. However, the Cacos struggled throughout the war due to a lack of training, supplies, and foreign assistance. Contrary to the Wilson administration’s fears, Germany had little desire to get involved in Haiti’s internal affairs. No other country in the region wanted to challenge American control of Haiti. As a result, the Cacos had to fight alone against the Americans and their local collaborators in two wars.

The First Caco War

The Cacos began their war of resistance the moment the Americans began to take control of the island. From 1915 to 1918, US forces fought the rebels in what was called the First Caco War. Marine patrols, backed by naval vessels on Haiti’s inland waterways, assaulted Caco strongholds deep within the island to prevent them from creating safe zones. The Cacos were not armed sufficiently and struggled to hold off the American onslaught.

One of the senior Marine officers involved in hunting the Cacos was Major Smedley Butler. A veteran of Marine operations in Asia and Latin America, Butler believed that the best way for American forces to gain control of the country was to directly strike against principal rebel strongholds. His superior, Littleton Waller, shared that view and ordered his brigade to attack the Cacos. He took his battalion into the countryside outside of Cap-Haitien and began attacking the Cacos. Using local scouts that he trusted, Butler was able to find ways around Caco positions to ambush and attack them.

In November 1915, Butler and his men found the Cacos’ main stronghold of Fort Rivière in northern Haiti. He was able to encircle and launch a surprise attack on the garrison, which never expected the Americans to attack so far away from the cities. Butler’s men slaughtered the defenders and managed to escape with few losses. This action effectively ended the First Caco War (although American patrols continued) and Butler was awarded his second Medal of Honor.

Second Caco War and US Occupation After WWI

It did not take long for the Cacos to rise up again. The Haitian public hated the American-trained Gendarmerie because of their abuses and atrocities. American forces were distracted by the Wilson administration’s decision to enter WWI in 1917, and a lack of local police meant that the Cacos could set up bases again to attack American forces. The use of the corvée system of forced labor prompted many peasants to join the Cacos, and Charlemagne Péralte’s leadership professionalized the rebel force.

After the Gendarmerie lost several battles, American forces resumed their attacks on the Cacos. Finding that the rebels blended in with the local population, Marine forces ruthlessly targeted anyone whom they suspected of assisting the Cacos. Local informers were recruited by the Marines and Gendarmerie to hunt down rebels. Marine columns moved into the countryside to attack them. The brutal killings of Haitians led to a Congressional inquiry in the US but did not slow down American operations. Casualties ran higher than in the first war, but the Americans held the upper hand.

After a failed assault by the Cacos on Port-au-Prince, American forces tracked down Péralte and killed him, crucifying his body to send a message. His successor, Benoît Batraville, continued to lead the revolt but he too was killed in 1920 after also trying to take the capital. Once the Cacos lost their leadership, the revolt fizzled out and the survivors ran to the jungle to be hunted down. This was the last time any Haitians used force to try and end the American occupation.

End of the Occupation and Lessons for the US Military

From 1922 to 1935, the United States ruled Haiti through a mixture of military and civilian officials whose sole aim was to support American economic interests in the country. Strikes and protests continued after the Caco wars and were brutally put down by the Gendarmerie. Despite modest improvements in local infrastructure, the country was still poor and discontent with the American-backed government remained widespread. Nonetheless, every American president after Wilson insisted on maintaining the occupation.

This changed with the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. As part of his “Good Neighbor” policy, FDR vowed to withdraw US forces from Haiti. Haitian officials gradually took over administration from American officials and the Gendarmerie increased in size. Roosevelt felt that American forces had accomplished everything they could. President Stenio Vincent of Haiti negotiated the withdrawal of US forces during the early 1930s, and the remaining garrison was withdrawn in 1934 though the US continued to fund the Gendarmerie.

The US Marines, having been the principal force on the island, learned a lot from their experiences. Many Marine officers in WWII, such as Alexander Vandegrift, Lewis “Chesty” Puller, Herman Hanneken, and others learned how to fight in the jungle in Haiti. They applied their experience in Haiti when they fought the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. Additionally, the use of such ruthless counterinsurgency methods became part of Marine doctrine. Such tactics reappeared in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The war in Haiti became a classic study of how the US could use a small force to crush a revolt and bring a degree of stability to strategically important countries.

Popular history has long consigned the cavalry charge to the grave with the advent of industrial warfare on an unprecedented scale across the Western Front in 1914. Yet the cavalry charge refused its epitaph, surviving for three more decades as it adapted to the broken landscapes and sweeping expanses of the two world wars. Read on to find out, as closely as the historical evidence permits, when and where history witnessed the last successful cavalry charge.

1914: A Death Blow for This Most Noble of Arms?

If the opening days of the First World War on the Western Front stirred cavalry officers and troopers with visions of decisive action at the point of cold steel, those illusions were soon overtaken by reality. The great mounted formations fielded by both the Entente and the Central Powers entered the campaign with two principal operational tasks: to screen the advancing armies through reconnaissance and skirmishing; and to exploit any weakness in the enemy line in the hope of dislocating it and easing the advance of the infantry. As Germany’s cavalry corps streamed down the sun-baked roads of Belgium and France, while those of the Entente rode out to meet them, the battlefield delivered its verdict with unforgiving speed.

At Haelen and a dozen nameless roadside skirmishes in early August 1914, bolt-action rifles and machine guns made ruin of lance and saber, leaving fields strewn with bodies and riderless horses. Gone were the days of great chevauchées; the cavalrymen saw themselves increasingly fighting as dragoons: riding into combat but fighting as dismounted skirmishers, irrespective of their actual designation. The German defeat on the Marne in September 1914 and the end of the race to the sea in October saw the front solidify in place as trench networks began appearing. Without room to maneuver, faced with its diminishing importance and its inability to force the stalemate, cavalry was sent to the rear to await a breakthrough. They would wait four years.

The Secondary Fronts of the Great War: A Saving Grace for the Cavalry

On the Eastern Front and across the theaters of the Orient, the war assumed a different character. Distances were so immense, landscapes so unforgiving, that the front resisted the rigid immobility that came to define the West. In these expansive theaters, cavalry retained a meaningful, if diminished, role. Their value as a screening force remained beyond dispute, while their capacity to deliver shock action endured in circumstances that still favored speed and surprise. Few episodes illustrate this more vividly than the charge of the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade against Turkish positions around the town of Beersheba during the Third Battle of Gaza in the autumn of 1917.

The Charge at Beersheba, 1917

The desert town of Beersheba anchored the Turkish left flank and thus held the key to unravelling the Ottoman line in southern Palestine. Having first tested the position with infantry assaults, the British resolved to strike from the open desert with the Anzac Mounted Division. The decisive task fell to the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, which committed two regiments against the fortified Turkish positions. Between them and their objective stretched four miles of exposed ground. They raced across it at a furious gallop, riding through artillery and rifle fire that, though intense, proved remarkably inaccurate.

Private Eric George Elliott, watching from the infantry, never forgot the spectacle:

“It was the bravest, most awe-inspiring sight I’ve ever witnessed, and they were yelling, swearing and shouting. There were more than 500 Aussie horsemen. As they thundered past, my hair stood on end. The boys were wild-eyed and yelling their heads off” (Jarymowycz, 2008, p. 147).

Despite their losses, the Australians reached the Turkish line. Confronted with hundreds of horsemen bearing down at full speed, many of the Ottoman defenders broke before contact, allowing the Light Horse to seize Beersheba at relatively low cost.

In the war’s aftermath, cavalry officers and military theorists across Europe proved reluctant to consign the mounted arm to history. Many dismissed the tank as the peculiar offspring of trench warfare, while pointing to the cavalry’s few but celebrated successes, above all the charge at Beersheba, as evidence that the horse had not yet yielded the battlefield. For a time, at least, they were proved right.

The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1921: Great Cavalry Clashes in the East.

The collapse of the Central Powers in 1918 left Eastern Europe as a mosaic of new and fiercely contested states carved from the remains of the Russian Empire. Though consumed by civil war since 1917, the young Soviet state had, by January 1919, recovered sufficient strength to reclaim territories it had been forced to cede under duress in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Soviet armies therefore advanced westward into Ukraine and Belarus, spearheaded by the formidable 1st Cavalry Army, the Konarmiya. Ukrainians resisted the Soviets in a bitter struggle of their own, but for the purposes of this article, it is the Polish Army’s encounter with the Soviets at the Battle of Komarów in August 1920 that commands attention. There, in the vast plains of Eastern Europe, cavalry fought one of its last great set-piece battles, one whose lessons would shape both Polish and Soviet mounted doctrine until the Second World War.

The Battle of Komarów, 1920

The largest cavalry battle fought in Europe since the Napoleonic Wars pitted General Semyon Budyonny’s Konarmiya, four cavalry divisions nearly 17,000 sabers strong, advancing from the Lviv region towards Warsaw, against the forces of the Polish Southern Front: some 6,000 Uhlans under General Juliusz Rómmel, supported by infantry formations. Rather than a single clash, the two armies fought several actions over two weeks around the town of Komarów, where villages, crossroads, and commanding ground became the prizes of a relentless fighting that ultimately blunted the Soviet spearhead and broke the back of the Konarmiya.

The decisive encounter came near the village of Wolica Śniatycka, where the Soviet 6th Cavalry Division was shattered by a charge of the Polish 1st Uhlan Regiment. The Poles caught their opponents as they were still deploying, and, exploiting the full momentum of the charge, broke the Soviet line before it had properly formed. What followed was a fierce mêlée. After some 30 minutes of bitter fighting, the Soviets withdrew, having suffered around 3,000 casualties. The Poles emerged as the undisputed victors with only 500 casualties.

Taken as a whole, the Battle of Komarów did more than the scattered mounted successes of the Great War to reinforce the faith of cavalry officers and generals in the continued military value of the mounted arm. Both belligerents drew enduring doctrinal lessons from the campaign. The Poles and the Soviets would employ cavalry aggressively as shock formations throughout the Second World War, while the United States, France, and Germany likewise entered the conflict with cavalry units ranging from battalions and regiments to full divisions.

1939: Cavalry Meets Blitzkrieg in Poland

On September 1, 1939, Germany unleashed its new doctrine of combined-arms warfare against Poland. As panzer formations, supported by close air power, ruptured the Polish defensive line, the Polish High Command responded according to the lessons it believed it had learned from the Polish-Soviet War, committing its mobile reserve of eleven cavalry brigades and two motorized cavalry brigades to seal the breaches. This did not mean charging on horseback against German tanks. More often than not, these formations fought dismounted, relying on anti-tank rifles, artillery, and fieldcraft in an effort to contain the German advance. Yet the cavalry saber was not wholly absent from the campaign. On several occasions, Polish cavalry crossed blades with German infantry and, in a handful of engagements, achieved notable local success.

The Mythmaking Around the Charge at Krojanty

The enduring myth of Polish cavalry charging German panzers grew out of one such cavalry engagement near the Brda River. There, several squadrons of Polish Uhlans under Colonel Kazimierz Mastalerz charged against the rear of a German infantry battalion as it attempted to cross the river. Taken completely by surprise, the German infantry suffered heavily and began to fall back. The success, however, proved fleeting. As the Uhlans reformed after the charge, German armored cars armed with 20mm autocannon suddenly entered the fight, sweeping the exposed horsemen with devastating fire. Colonel Mastalerz and some twenty of his troopers were killed before the remainder of the regiment could disengage.

When German, and perhaps Italian, war correspondents reached the battlefield after the fighting had moved on, they fashioned from the scattered evidence a compelling tale of obsolete horsemen hurling themselves, lances levelled, against Germany’s modern armored might. It was simply propaganda dramatizing the triumph of mechanized warfare over a supposedly antiquated foe. The story traveled far and was repeated uncritically by sections of the Western Allied media, and has continued to shape popular perceptions of the German invasion of Poland ever since.

Krasnobród and the Success of the Uhlans

Not every mounted clash ended in disaster for the Poles. In late September 1939, near Krasnobród, a squadron of the 25th Uhlans was countercharged by German cavalry screening the 8th Wehrmacht Infantry Division. A brief but savage mêlée followed, in which the Polish horsemen gained the upper hand. Having driven off their German counterparts, the lancers pressed on into the German communications line and overran elements of the divisional headquarters. Junior officer Kamil Dziewanowski remembered the shock of the encounter:

“Sabres and lances went to work fiercely. Some confused German infantrymen pushed off our sabre blows with their rifle butts. Some simply tried to cover their heads with their arms, but our lances reached even those who tried to hide between the wagons” (Jarymowycz, 2008, p. 169).

Such dramatic engagements could do little to alter the fate of the campaign.

While Polish cavalry achieved occasional tactical success as a mobile shock force, the September Campaign also exposed the narrow circumstances in which such operations remained feasible. Accordingly, when German and French cavalry next met during Fall Gelb, they did so chiefly as mounted infantry fighting in difficult terrain, above all in the Ardennes.

On the Eastern Front, the Soviets continued to employ cavalry as an offensive arm at both the tactical and operational levels. In doing so, the Red Army would demonstrate that, under the right conditions, cavalry still retained a place on the battlefields of the Blitzkrieg era.

1941-1945: Cavalry in Soviet Operational Art

The Red Army, like that of the Poles, held no illusions about the place of cavalry in modern war. The Soviet Field Regulations of 1940 assigned mounted formations a clearly defined operational role: striking enemy flanks and rear areas; exploiting weak sectors of the front independently or alongside infantry and armor; conducting envelopments and encirclements; and harassing an enemy in retreat or active defense.

These missions lay at the heart of the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle that would, after four years of bitter fighting, ultimately prevail over the German Blitzkrieg. Even during the desperate summer of 1941, the 15,000-strong Soviet cavalry corps, heavily supported by machine guns, artillery, and other modern weapons, carried out such missions with remarkable success following the destruction of most of the Red Army’s mechanized formations.

Few episodes illustrate this better than Colonel Lev Dovator’s two-day raid behind German lines between August 28 and 30, 1941. Breaking through the German 450th Infantry Regiment with 3,000 horsemen and a handful of machine-gun detachments, Dovator’s force overran two regimental headquarters and the Sixth Army’s topographical department, destroyed some 200 motor vehicles, inflicted roughly 2,500 casualties (according to Soviet reports), and returned to Soviet lines still fully capable of further operations.

Even as the Red Army rebuilt its mechanized formations, Soviet cavalry units continued to fulfil these exploitation and raiding missions throughout the war. Among the most remarkable was the deep raid conducted by Major General Pavel Belov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which operated behind the German Ninth Army from January to June 1942. For five months, Belov’s horsemen remained a constant menace to the German rear, compelling the diversion of as many as seven divisions in repeated attempts to destroy them. Throughout such operations, cavalry fought mounted or dismounted as circumstances demanded, and saber charges were far from uncommon.

Supported by mechanized formations, Soviet horsemen also played a vital role in reducing encircled German forces, most notably during the Battle of Korsun-Cherkassy in Ukraine in 1944. Against this backdrop, it is scarcely surprising that the last significant recorded saber charge was carried out not by the Italian Savoia Cavalleria at Izbushensky in 1942, as is so often claimed, but by cavalry serving under Soviet command.

1945: The Last Confirmed Cavalry Charge

Two campaigns present plausible claimants for the final cavalry charge in military history: the East Pomeranian Offensive and the Manchurian Strategic Offensive. This article confines itself to the former. The decision is a methodological one rather than a historical judgement. Tactical evidence for the Soviet advance into Manchuria in August 1945 remains fragmentary and, where it survives in detail, is largely confined to Russian-language sources. Rather than reconstruct a hypothetical charge by one of General Issa Pliyev’s cavalry corps in Manchuria on the basis of incomplete and uncertain evidence, this article turns to the best documented candidate.

The Charge at Schönfeld, March 1, 1945

The last saber cavalry charge of true military significance unfolded during the final months of the Third Reich, in March 1945. As the Soviet-led First Polish Army advanced westwards through Pomerania in support of the wider drive towards the Baltic, it came up against the German defensive line anchoring the province. On March 1, an assault by the tanks and infantry of the 2nd Infantry Division against the fortified village of Schönfeld, perched atop Hill 157 and protected by anti-tank guns, stalled in the exposed, waterlogged ground below. Confronted with this rough terrain, the Soviets committed the 1st Independent “Warsaw” Cavalry Brigade.

Concealed in nearby woodland, two squadrons of Uhlans assembled beneath the cover of an artillery-laid smoke screen. At 15:45, a single red flare rose into the leaden Pomeranian sky. The horsemen burst forward at the gallop, covered two kilometres of open marshland, crossed a railway embankment, and swept up the slopes of Hill 157. Sabers flashed, grenades tumbled into the trenches, the anti-tank guns were overrun, and within a few minutes, the fighting spilled into the streets of Schönfeld itself. The German defenders gave way, Schönfeld fell, and cavalry triumphed on the field of glory for one last time.

In 1946, the Red Army either disbanded or converted into fully mechanized formations most of the 26 cavalry divisions with which it had ended the war. The few mounted formations that remained in the Soviet Army, retained for reconnaissance and occupation duties in the rugged, sparsely developed regions of the USSR, would in turn disappear under Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s sweeping reforms of 1954 and 1955. The last of them, the 4th Guards Cavalry Division, was disbanded in April 1955.

Source

• Jarymowycz, R. J. , Cavalry from hoof to track, Wesport, Praeger Security International, 2008.

At the onset of the Second World War, European powers controlled the entirety of North Africa. The region’s vast deserts would become an inhospitable battleground as the war raged across the dunes. Victory in the North African Campaign was of vital importance for the Allies, as it would allow them control of the Suez Canal and key supply routes to British colonial territories. Fighting in the desert’s extreme conditions would take many forms, from large-scale tank battles to ambushes and sieges.

1. Battle of Sidi Barrani

In September 1940, Italian forces situated in Libya launched an offensive into British Egypt. The Italian 10th Army held its position at the coastal town of Sidi Barrani, located 50 miles inside Egypt. By December, British and Indian forces were prepared to launch their first counteroffensive against the Italians, known as Operation Compass.

British patrols had identified a fatal flaw in the Italian defensive line, a 15-mile unguarded gap. British General Sir Archibald Wavell decided to exploit this weakness despite the fact that the Italian forces numbered 60,000 compared to the Allies’ mere 36,000.

The British 7th Armored Division, alongside the 4th Indian Division, were sent through the gap. The 7th Armored Division continued northwest to cut off the coastal supply road to Sidi Barrani and encircled the Italian forces. The Indian Division turned northwards and captured numerous Italian encampments.

Meanwhile, as the 40,000-strong Italian force at Sidi Barrani faced constant naval bombardment, a second Allied force pushed westward along the coast towards the town.

Fighting ended on December 11. The Italians surrendered, and their remaining 38,300 troops became prisoners of war.

The Battle of Sidi Barrani was the opening battle of Operation Compass and was a major victory for the Allied forces in North Africa, who now found themselves on the front foot against a retreating, diminished Italian force.

2. Battle of Beda Fomm

Allied forces advanced at a tremendous speed during Operation Compass, forcing the Italians into successive retreats. British intelligence learned that the remnants of the Italian 10th Army were retreating south from the Libyan city of Benghazi via a coastal road.

The 7th Armored Division, under the command of Major General Michael O’Moore Creagh, were ordered to intercept the Italians. In an audacious maneuver, the Allied forces cut across the desert and managed to overtake the Italian forces, which were being hotly pursued by the Australian 6th Division.

Unbeknownst to the Italians, the British forces ahead of them had set up numerous roadblocks and were lying in wait. On February 5, 1941, the Italians walked into the trap. Fighting raged for two days as the Italians attempted to break through the British lines. However, the pursuing Australian force rapidly closed in on the Italians from behind.

Eventually, the Italian 10th Army was forced into submission. Twenty-five thousand troops were taken prisoner, and 107 tanks were captured. The Battle of Beda Fomm was a decisive defeat for the Italians, and their total defeat in North Africa seemed imminent. However, the Italian capitulation at Beda Fomm signaled to Nazi Germany that they would have to enter the North African theater.

3. The Siege of Tobruk

Tobruk was the only deep-water port in eastern Libya. As such, it became a major objective of both the Allied and Axis forces. The Allies successfully captured Tobruk in January 1941 during Operation Compass.

However, following the defeat of the Italians, Germany had dispatched their forces to North Africa under the command of Erwin Rommel. Eager to make an instant impact in North Africa, Rommel made the capture of Tobruk his primary objective.

Tobruk was held by predominantly Australian forces. Between April and November 1941, the defenders repelled numerous attempts by Rommel to capture the city, garnering themselves the nickname, “The Rats of Tobruk.”

The Royal Navy was able to bring in supplies and reinforcements. During the autumn, a number of the Australian forces were relieved and replaced by British and Polish troops.

The Siege of Tobruk was eventually lifted during the Allied Operation Crusader, when forces from New Zealand reached the city on November 27.

4. Battle of Gazala

Despite being forced to retreat by Operation Crusader, Rommel was anxious to advance yet again into Libya.

Allied forces had constructed a fortified line at the coastal town of Gazala, which stretched 50 miles south to the town of Bir Hakeim.

Rommel devised an audacious sweeping flank attack. The Italian 132nd Armored Division would attack Bir Hakeim. Meanwhile, the 15th and 21st Panzer divisions would swing around the bottom of the Gazala line to attack the Allies in the rear.

The attack was launched on May 26, 1942. However, Italian forces met much greater resistance at Bir Hakeim than anticipated. Furthermore, Rommel’s forces struggled in the difficult terrain and soon found themselves trapped in an area nicknamed “The Cauldron.” Running dangerously low on supplies, Rommel ordered a second attack. The Axis forces captured two British tactical headquarters, resulting in a breakdown in Allied communication.

Rommel continued his attack, and by June 10, he shattered the Allied defenses. Approximately 98,000 Allied troops were killed, injured, or captured, and their remaining forces retreated all the way back to Egypt.

The Battle of Gazala is considered one of the greatest victories of Rommel’s decorated military career. The victory also allowed Axis forces to finally capture Tobruk.

5. First Battle of El Alamein

Following the crushing defeat at Gazala, Allied forces established defensive positions at El Alamein in Egypt and prepared for Rommel’s advance. Rommel launched a vicious attack on the Allied defensive line. However, the Allied forces, which comprised troops from Britain, Australia, India, South Africa, and New Zealand, successfully repelled the Axis attack.

After losing a significant number of his panzers, Rommel chose to end his offensive. Sensing an opportunity, British commander Claude Auchinleck decided to strike against Rommel, hoping to destroy the Axis forces once and for all. Despite gaining some minor victories, Auchinleck’s plan failed, and victory over Rommel seemed unlikely.

While the First Battle of El Alamein ended in stalemate, the Allies had successfully halted the Axis advance. Although Auchinleck had played a key role in the First Battle of El Alamein, he was replaced by General Bernard Montgomery.

6. Second Battle of El Alamein

After assuming control of the Allied 8th Army, Montgomery worked tirelessly to reorganize and re-energize his forces in preparation for an offensive against the Axis.

The Second Battle of El Alamein commenced on October 23, 1942 with a dramatic aerial bombardment of German positions. A week later, Montgomery launched the second phase of the attack and sent infantry and armored divisions to break through the depleted German lines.

While the Allied advance was slowed by numerous attempted counter-offensives by the Germans, the Allies successfully opened a six-mile-wide hole in the German defenses.

Rommel, who had only just returned to North Africa after having required medical treatment back in Europe, could do little to prevent the Allied advance. Furthermore, the Axis forces were running dangerously low on resources as their supply lines became overstretched.

On November 2, Montgomery launched Operation Supercharge, a thrust that aimed to destroy as many German tanks as possible. The operation was a resounding success, and the Allies gained significant ground, destroying over 100 Axis tanks.

Rommel ordered a retreat as his forces capitulated, and the Allies opened a 12-mile-wide hole in the Axis defensive line. The Second Battle of El Alamein was a decisive victory for the Allies that resulted in the Allies pursuing the remnants of the Axis forces far into western Libya.

7. Operation Torch

Following the capitulation of the Axis forces in Libya, the Allies launched an audacious invasion into Algeria and Morocco.

Operation Torch culminated in the amphibious landing of 107,000 Allied troops via 850 vessels. The landings, which took place on November 8, 1942, were met with resistance from forces of Vichy France, a puppet state of Nazi Germany comprising Southern France and their North African colonies.

The operation was devised as a three-pronged attack with Allied forces split into three forces. The Western Task Force would attack Morocco with the aim of capturing Casablanca. The Center Task Force would land at Oran, Algeria, while the Eastern Task Force would aim to capture Algiers. Once the task forces had successfully captured their objectives, they would regroup and march east to capture Tunis, thus creating a second front against the Axis forces in Tunisia.

Just two days after the landings, the Allies successfully captured their objectives. They faced relatively little resistance from the forces of Vichy France. Furthermore, members of the French Resistance successfully attempted a coup in Algiers, which significantly weakened the city’s defensive abilities.

The landings of Operation Torch proved to be valuable lessons for the later Normandy Landings of D-Day. The Operation’s success now meant that the remaining Axis forces in Tunisia were steadily being enveloped by the enclosing Allied forces to both their east and west. Victory in North Africa for the Allies was close.

8. Battle of Kasserine Pass

As the Allies closed in from both directions, the situation for the Axis was becoming increasingly severe. However, Rommel saw an opportunity to break through the Allied lines.

Kasserine Pass, a 2-mile-wide pass through Tunisia’s Dorsal Mountains, was Rommel’s objective. By punching through the pass, he hoped to relieve pressure on his lines and capture key Allied supply depots.

On February 14, Rommel personally led the 10th Panzer division through the pass and easily penetrated through Allied lines, forcing them to retreat. By February 21, the Axis forces were closing in on the town of Thala. However, Rommel was unable to take the town and instead elected to end the offensive, having relieved the pressure on his lines. Allied forces retook the pass on February 23 as the Axis withdrew.

Although the Battle of Kasserine Pass’s impact on the outcome of the North African Campaign was minimal, it signified the first time US troops faced off against Axis forces. The Battle of Kasserine Pass indicated the Axis’s superior experience and equipment. It was a severe wake-up call for the fresh US forces, who were ill-prepared to fight battle-hardened German troops.

9. Operation Strike

Tunisia remained the Axis forces’ last remaining foothold in North Africa. Operation Strike was devised as the Allies final offensive against their positions. The operation was planned as a thrust to punch through the final Axis lines and capture the city of Tunis.

In the early hours of May 6, 1943, the 4th Indian Division and the 4th British Division advanced on either side of the Medjez-Tunis Road, assaulting key Axis defensive positions. After the enemy had been cleared, the 7th Armored Division would advance down the Tunis Road, while the 6th Armored Division would take a parallel road toward the city.

The armored divisions advanced behind the cover of a devastating artillery bombardment, and as a result, the Allies faced relatively feeble resistance from the remaining Axis forces. By the early evening hours of May 7, Allied forces reached the outskirts of Tunis. They were greeted by a joyous crowd of civilians, who threw flowers in front of the procession and offered wine to the troops.

Tunis had been captured, and the Axis had been defeated across North Africa. For the Allies, this victory was of monumental importance. It allowed them to maintain control of key supply routes while opening the opportunity to invade Italy from the African coast.

The North African Campaign featured numerous battles that were of great significance during the Second World War. Battles fought in the North African desert are notable for their inclusion of a diverse array of combatants from around the world. British, South African, Australian, New Zealand, Indian, and Polish troops fought side by side among the dunes. Ultimately, the North African Campaign played an important role in the outcome of the war. The Allies successfully defeated the Nazi war machine on land for the first time, thus resulting in a significant boost to Allied morale.

Most Western Allied commanders during WWII were very conventional and often cautious in their operational planning. Their opponents in the German high command were usually unafraid of them. However, they believed that the aggressive American tank commander George Patton was a more effective tactician and struggled to contain his armies on the battlefield.

George Patton: American Practitioner of Blitzkrieg

One of the major tactical innovations of the Second World War was the massing of tanks and other armored vehicles to breach enemy defenses in a swift manner, then to follow this breakthrough with waves of infantry. This approach, known in German as Bewegungskrieg (more commonly known as Blitzkrieg), became a defining feature of the war. Because German officers were the first to execute this tactic on the battlefield, they were impressed by Allied commanders who were willing to do the same.

Even before America’s involvement in WWII, General George Patton studied the concept intensely. He read the works of JFC Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, two British officers who promoted the theory of mechanized warfare. Additionally, he read and studied the writings of German General Heinz Guderian and French General Charles de Gaulle, both of whom also emphasized speedy advances. He himself was a pioneer in the use of tanks for the US Army, having commanded a tank force in World War I. Additionally, he embraced the idea of speed based on his time in Mexico when he was helping hunt down Pancho Villa with a cavalry force.

Patton wasn’t the only Allied commander to embrace rapid maneuver warfare. Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov was a firm believer in large-scale, armor-tipped advances. American General Joe Collins earned the nickname “Lightning” for his emphasis on sudden assaults. The Allies built a massive armored force during the war that far outnumbered Axis forces. However, German commanders believed that George Patton was the most effective practitioner of Blitzkrieg in Allied uniform.

Why the Germans Considered Patton More Dangerous Than Montgomery

Throughout the war, Patton maintained a brutal rivalry with British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Both men had different command responsibilities (“Monty” outranked Patton and commanded a much larger force by 1945) but received extensive press coverage and both were among the most famous generals of the war. Not only did they feud over resources and strategic planning, but they also embraced different styles of command. This did not go unnoticed by German commanders.

Monty was a believer in using massed firepower and incremental advances. For instance, at El Alamein in Egypt, Monty used a phased offensive with overwhelming artillery and air power to break through the Axis lines. His subsequent effort to pursue the Germans and Italians was rather lethargic, enabling them to fight another day. This method was very common among Western Allied commanders, who were reluctant to push their armies too hard. As such, German commanders embraced the idea of organizing quick counterattacks to blunt the momentum of Allied advances.

Patton’s emphasis on continued movements without delay disrupted German operational planning. Knowing that his forces could be subjected to counterattacks if they moved too slowly, he urged his subordinates to push forward as much as possible. On several occasions, Patton caught Axis commanders off guard by continuing his advances when other Allied generals may have been willing to tolerate a tactical pause.

The Third Army in Normandy and Brittany

In January 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower overruled some of his subordinates and gave Patton command of the newly formed Third Army, then stationed in Britain. At the time, Patton had been effectively sidelined after he slapped two shell-shocked soldiers in Sicily. This incident led to his relief and a formal apology. However, Eisenhower knew that Patton was a ruthless and capable commander who could help lead the Allied breakout from Normandy. Thus, Patton was given a crucial role in the Allied plans.

On August 1, 1944, the Third Army officially became operational and began following the First Army’s advance as part of Operation Cobra. Patton reported to General Omar Bradley, now commanding the Twelfth Army Group. Bradley wanted Patton to pivot west towards the German garrisons in Brittany, then pinned down by French resistance units. Patton partially agreed, but modified his orders to take advantage of the collapsing German lines. He sent one corps into Brittany while another one, with a heavy concentration of armor, pushed south and east to cut off the retreating Germans. He insisted on driving hard, embracing the rapid maneuver warfare that made his reputation.

German intelligence had not anticipated the arrival of the Third Army in Normandy. At the time, they thought Patton was in Britain and that the newly arriving troops and equipment were replacements for the First Army’s casualties. When American forces stormed out of the Normandy pocket in multiple directions, they were stunned and unprepared for Patton’s ruthless drive. An attempt to cut off the Third Army from the First Army at Mortain failed miserably. Only Bradley’s decision to pause the advance kept Patton from cutting off the retreating Germans at Falaise.

Patton and Operation Fortitude

Before Patton arrived in France, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force) chose to weaponize the German fear of his reputation by giving him command of the First Army Group, a new headquarters formed in Britain. This new command was a total fabrication. The Allies had learned through a spy network that the Germans were afraid of him and wanted the Wehrmacht to assume that he was going to play a major role in the Normandy landings. Thus, Operation Fortitude was born, one of the largest deception plans in military history.

The scale of the deception was remarkable. Thousands of dummy vehicles, tanks, artillery, and other equipment were manufactured throughout Kent and East Anglia in eastern England. Radio broadcasts were generated to pretend that an army was being formed. Some actual units were attached to this “army group” before being sent to fight under a real headquarters in France. All the while, Patton “inspected” his new command while secretly preparing the Third Army’s battle plan. Privately, he disdained his role, but was willing to follow orders if it got him back in Eisenhower’s good graces.

Fortitude succeeded beyond SHAEF’s wildest dreams. The Abwehr, Germany’s military intelligence branch, believed that Patton was planning on taking a force with 1,000,000 men in fifty infantry and armored divisions into France, specifically by landing them in the Pas-de-Calais. As a result, the German 15th Army was ordered to stay in that area, depriving the two German armies in Normandy of much-needed reinforcements. This enabled the Allies to build up control over the beachhead. Berlin only learned that Patton was in Normandy by the time Cobra was launched.

The Third Army on the Siegfried and Moselle Lines

Patton’s drive deep into France was one of the best examples of the United States practicing Blitzkrieg the way the Germans had done in 1940. Much of the countryside was overrun very quickly and German units struggled to react to the Third Army’s spearheads. However, by September 1944, Patton’s forces were forced to halt due to acute gas shortages. General Eisenhower ordered supplies and gasoline in reserve to be sent north to Montgomery’s armies, forcing the Third Army to come to a complete halt on the Moselle River. This gave the retreating Germans enough time to regroup and prepare additional defenses on the Siegfried Line on the Franco-German border.

While German commanders did fear Patton’s advance, they did not have enough armor to mass against his forces. Therefore, they relied on a series of fortifications, including the city of Metz, to slow his men down. A series of counterattacks on the Third Army as it crossed the Moselle failed, but did buy time for German forces to dig in. Despite poor weather causing vehicles to get stuck in mud, American forces pushed onwards, seizing Metz after three months of fighting and crossing the Saar River.

German Army Group G was a formation created from the remnants of several different German field armies in France. Initially very weak, the command received significant reinforcements and managed to hold off the Third Army before it could make serious gains. While German commanders were not totally obsessed with Patton personally, they understood that his army was one of the most heavily armed in SHAEF’s order of battle and they allocated resources accordingly.

The Relief of Bastogne and Patton’s Final Attacks

In December 1944, the Germans pulled off a stunning feat by driving a hole deep into the First Army’s positions on the Belgian-German border. Allied commanders feared that German troops could reach the Meuse River and sought to stem the breakthrough. General Patton, at the time planning his own offensive against the Siegfried Line, sent his forces north and attacked German troops besieging the Belgian town of Bastogne. The Third Army inflicted enormous losses that the Germans could not easily replace. This set the stage for the Allied drive towards the Rhine River in spring 1945.

Alongside the Seventh Army, Patton’s men conducted a massive encirclement operation on the west bank of the river, capturing 60,000 Germans. By March 1945, he successfully slipped some of his forces over the Rhine before other Allied units could do so. From then on, it was a swift advance towards the German border with Czechoslovakia. Apart from a disastrous order to raid a POW camp believed to hold his son-in-law, Patton’s final battles were well-executed. He briefly commanded the Third Army during the occupation before he was relieved for making statements contradicting Eisenhower’s policy. He died in a hospital in Germany in December 1945 following a car accident and is buried at the American cemetery in Luxembourg.

The famous movie Patton, starring George C. Scott, as the general, depicted German officers as being obsessed with him and even assigning a staff officer to monitor his activities throughout the war. This was an exaggeration; German generals may have feared him, but did not deify him. German commanders believed that his army was successful largely due to the heavy amount of equipment it received. Nevertheless, they regarded him as a formidable commander who emulated their own tactical doctrines on the battlefield.

In May 1565, the horizon off Malta darkened with the sails of an enormous Ottoman armada. Thousands of soldiers had come to crush the Knights Hospitaller and seize one of the Mediterranean’s most strategically important islands. Standing against them was Jean de Valette, the 70-year-old Grand Master of the Order of St John. But de Valette did not stand alone. Alongside his Knights were soldiers, sailors, and thousands of Maltese defenders. Their survival would depend on sacrifice, endurance, and their refusal to surrender.

The Imbalance of Power in the Mediterranean

By the time the Ottoman fleet appeared off Malta on May 18, 1565, Jean de Valette had spent much of his life fighting.

Born around 1494 in southern France, he joined the Knights Hospitaller while still a young man and experienced the Order’s long struggle against Ottoman power firsthand. He fought during the Siege of Rhodes in 1522, when Suleiman the Magnificent forced the Knights from their island stronghold. He was later captured by Ottoman corsairs and spent time as a galley slave before eventually returning to the Order.

De Valette therefore understood the enemy approaching Malta better than most European commanders.

The odds were daunting. Contemporary manpower estimates differ, but the defenders probably numbered only several thousand men against an Ottoman army several times their size. The Knights themselves accounted for only a fraction of the island’s fighting strength. Several hundred Hospitallers fought alongside European professional soldiers and thousands of Maltese militiamen.

The Great Siege was never simply a battle between the Knights and the Ottomans. Malta’s inhabitants were essential to the island’s defense.

The Ottoman objective extended beyond destroying the Order. Malta occupied a strategic position between Sicily and North Africa. Removing the Knights would eliminate a persistent enemy of Ottoman shipping while strengthening Ottoman influence in the central Mediterranean.

De Valette prepared accordingly. Supplies were gathered, fortifications strengthened, and the defenders concentrated around the Grand Harbor. Birgu and Senglea became the heart of the defense, protected by Fort St Angelo and Fort St Michael.

Yet across the water stood a smaller fort whose fate would shape the entire siege.

Why Fort Saint Elmo Became a Strategic Sacrifice

Fort Saint Elmo stood at the tip of the Sciberras Peninsula, between the Grand Harbor and Marsamxett Harbor. Whoever controlled it could influence access to both harbors.

For the Ottoman commanders, Saint Elmo therefore seemed an obvious first target. They expected the small fort to fall quickly and use it as a springboard for further operations.

Instead, it resisted for about a month.

Ottoman cannon relentlessly pounded Saint Elmo, smashing its walls and turning its defenses into rubble. Assault followed assault. At night, men and supplies crossed the harbor from the main Christian positions to reinforce the exhausted garrison.

De Valette faced a terrible calculation. Every soldier sent into Saint Elmo was desperately needed elsewhere. As the fort deteriorated, its defenders understood that remaining there increasingly meant death.

Yet abandoning it would allow the Ottoman army to turn its full strength against Birgu and Senglea.

De Valette kept Saint Elmo fighting.

Its defenders included knights, professional soldiers, Maltese fighters, and others drawn into an increasingly savage struggle. The Ottoman army suffered heavily for every section of ruined fortification it captured.

On June 23, Saint Elmo finally fell. Most of its remaining defenders were killed.

The fall was a tactical Ottoman victory, but the month-long struggle had badly disrupted their timetable. Instead of collapsing within days, the fort had consumed weeks of campaigning and inflicted severe casualties.

Most importantly, Saint Elmo had bought de Valette time.

Across the Grand Harbor, the defenders of Birgu and Senglea had used those precious weeks to prepare for the assault they knew was coming.

The siege was only beginning.

Holding the Line at Birgu and Senglea

With Saint Elmo destroyed, the struggle became even more desperate as Ottoman attention shifted toward the main defensive positions.

Birgu and Senglea formed densely defended peninsulas jutting into the Grand Harbor. Behind their fortifications were crowded soldiers, civilians, wounded men, and families whose survival depended upon holding the walls.

The Ottomans repeatedly bombarded and assaulted the defenses during July and August. Fighting sometimes descended into brutal hand-to-hand combat at damaged walls and breaches.

De Valette did not command from a distant headquarters. Despite his age, the Grand Master remained close to the fighting. During one Ottoman assault in August, attackers penetrated part of Birgu’s defenses. De Valette reportedly rushed toward the threatened position and joined his men rather than withdrawing to safety.

The defenders had endured weeks of artillery fire, casualties, hunger, exhaustion, and the knowledge that defeat could mean death or enslavement. De Valette’s willingness to expose himself to the same danger helped make him more than an administrator issuing commands. He became the living symbol of the island’s resistance.

Yet focusing exclusively on de Valette risks overlooking the people who made his resistance possible. Maltese soldiers fought alongside the Knights throughout the siege. Local knowledge also proved invaluable, while civilians helped with the immense task of maintaining a fortified community under near-constant attack. The wounded required treatment, damaged defenses needed repair, and ammunition and supplies had to reach the walls, and fires and destruction had to be dealt with.

Even the Città Vecchia of Malta, Mdina, contributed to the resistance. Its cavalry harassed Ottoman forces and threatened their communications, forcing the besiegers to remain alert beyond the main battlefield.

The defenders also improvised. When Ottoman forces attempted to overcome the fortifications through siege engines, mining, amphibious attacks, and repeated mass assaults, the garrison answered with countermines, artillery, incendiary weapons, and close-quarter fighting.

The result was attrition on a terrible scale. Each Ottoman attack might destroy another piece of the defenses, but each failed to deliver the decisive breakthrough. The defenders were being reduced, but so were their attackers.

As summer drew toward its end, the time that Valette had purchased at Saint Elmo was becoming Malta’s greatest weapon.

How a Relentless Stand Forced an Imperial Retreat

By late August, the siege had become a contest of endurance. The Ottoman army had spent months campaigning through the Maltese summer. Disease spread through the camp, casualties mounted, and the determination that had accompanied the fleet in May was being steadily eroded.

The defenders were also approaching their limits. Their fortifications were shattered, many of their comrades were dead or wounded, and there was no guarantee that the relief they had been awaiting from Sicily would arrive in time.

De Valette nevertheless refused to concede. That refusal became divisive when the promised relief force finally landed in Malta in September. The new troops were not an enormous army, but after months of attrition their arrival had an effect far greater than the numbers suggested.

For the exhausted defenders, they represented salvation. For the Ottoman commanders, they threatened to transform an already costly siege into an even more dangerous campaign. The Ottoman army began withdrawing. On September 8, the siege effectively ended. Malta had survived.

Christian Europe immediately celebrated the victory. For the Knights of St John, it transformed what could have been the destruction of their Order into their most famous military triumph. The Ottoman Empire’s expansion, led by Suleiman the Magnificent, was halted.

For Malta, the consequences were equally profound. De Valette emerged as the defending figure of the victory, but his achievement had depended upon a coalition of knights, professional soldiers, Maltese militia, sailors, laborers, and civilians.

The Great Siege demonstrated that fortifications alone could not save an island. Their effectiveness depended upon people willing to defend them after walls had collapsed and hope appeared increasingly irrational.

The siege also reshaped Malta itself. In 1566, construction began on a new fortified city on the Sciberras Peninsula—the same ground the Ottomans had occupied during the siege. It was named Valletta in honor of the Grand Master.

Jean de Valette died in 1568, only three years after the victory and before his new city was completed. Yet his reputation had already been secured. His achievement was not that he devised a single brilliant maneuver that destroyed the Ottoman army. His success came from something less dramatic but perhaps more difficult: keeping an exhausted garrison fighting long enough for the enemy’s advantages to disappear.

At St Elmo, he sacrificed time and men to delay the Ottoman advance. At Birgu and Senglea, he shared the dangers faced by his soldiers. And throughout the siege, he maintained a resistance that depended as much upon the determination of Malta’s inhabitants as upon the military traditions of the Knights of St John.

The Great Siege therefore belongs neither to de Valette alone nor exclusively to the Knights. It was the stand of an entire garrison, and Jean de Valette was the man who refused to allow it to break.

The Pearl Harbor attacks on December 7, 1941 shocked the American people. Within days, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Husband Kimmel was stripped of his command and blamed for his failure to prepare for the attack. Kimmel later claimed that he was made to take the fall by the federal government, and official files emerged suggesting that Washington withheld important information about threats to Pearl Harbor from Kimmel. Who was right?

The Rise and Fall of Admiral Kimmel

Born in Kentucky in 1882, Husband Kimmel was a Naval Academy graduate who swiftly rose through the ranks due to his astute attention to detail and his ability to impress his superiors. Just prior to WWI, he served as an adviser to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who was none other than Franklin Roosevelt. When the United States entered the war in 1917, he transferred to a surface warship as a gunnery officer and continued to gain experience on several ships, including the battleship USS New York.

In 1937, he managed to secure his first stars, becoming Rear Admiral and the senior Budget Officer for the Navy Department. Kimmel was analytical and approachable, with both men under him and overseeing him impressed by his demeanor and skills. This resulted in him becoming the commander of all the cruisers in the Pacific Fleet, based out of Hawaii. When Admiral James Richardson was removed from command for protesting the Fleet’s move to Pearl Harbor, Kimmel leapfrogged several other admirals to become the commander of the fleet with four-star rank in February 1941.

Upon taking command, he began to prepare the fleet for war. Task forces were reorganized to have different ship types, instead of squadrons only having one type of vessel. Target practice was revamped and ships were ordered to spend more time at sea. Islands further west were fortified, like Midway Atoll and Wake Island. All the while, he battled Washington bureaucracy, which insisted on taking a lot of his ships from him and transferring them to the Atlantic Fleet. As storm clouds gathered, he was determined to have his men prepared for the worst.

Why Washington Kept the Pacific Fleet in the Dark

It is often said that surprise attacks are not intelligence failures as much as policy failures. Ample evidence existed to show that Washington received information about Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor. However, the War and Navy Departments failed to ensure that Admiral Kimmel and his subordinates were aware of the extent of Japan’s military buildup or the intercepted messages that exposed Japanese intentions. Thanks to a mix of pride and paranoia, Admiral Harold Stark (Chief of Naval Operations) and General George Marshall (Army Chief of Staff) did not provide a full intelligence picture to Admiral Kimmel.

Japanese agents who were known to be active in Hawaii routinely transmitted messages to their handlers back in Tokyo. This included detailed observations of ship movements, locations of different squadrons on Oahu’s airfields, and other vital information. Additionally, Japanese transmissions between diplomats in Washington and officials in Tokyo revealed increasing anger over American policy. None of this was shared with Kimmel with any sense of urgency.

American spies and cryptographers in Washington had access to tools and information that Station HYPO in Oahu didn’t have until after the attacks. Additionally, intelligence staff in Pearl Harbor had a macrolevel view of the Pacific in which they could see the full extent of Japanese planning. The officers in Hawaii focused more on Japanese tactical developments and did not get the full picture. Admiral Kimmel believed an attack was possible, but he lacked the information to develop a full battle plan.

The Failure of Long-Range Reconnaissance

One shortage that plagued the Pacific Fleet in 1941 was the lack of long-range patrol aircraft. Despite requests to Washington by Admiral Kimmel and his staff, Pearl Harbor did not receive sufficient aircraft to maintain a 360° search radius. On December 7, 68 PBY Catalina seaplanes were in Oahu and most were grounded. Because American officials had no idea that the Japanese carrier strike group Kido Butai was actively steaming towards Hawaii, they did not send up planes to monitor its movements. Oahu’s radar stations also could not reach far enough out to identify the launch point for Japan’s carrier aircraft.

Admiral Kimmel also sent his carriers to ferry planes to islands west and south of Oahu. To assist them, some of the land-borne PBYs were assigned to patrol near the carrier groups. This was far away from the Kido Butai’s heading, which was north of Pearl Harbor. Had Washington agreed to provide more reconnaissance aircraft to Kimmel, he could have used them to cover gaps in his search radius. The Americans did not detect the approach of the Japanese fleet because Admiral Chuichi Nagumo ordered his ships to maintain radio silence.

One of the main elements of the American war plan in the event of a Japanese declaration of war was to launch as many long-range planes as possible to target any Japanese bases in range. Kimmel and his subordinates were afraid that using the PBYs too often could leave them unprepared to launch the airstrikes and left most of the planes on the ground. Pearl Harbor was left ill-prepared for the coming onslaught on the morning of December 7.

The Roberts Commission Findings

On December 18, 1941, President Roosevelt convened an inquiry into the failures to prepare for the attack. It was chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts and had four other members who were retired military brass. In January 1942, the Commission passed its findings on to the White House after a cursory investigation. These findings proved to be very contentious and, despite the Administration’s intentions, did not bury the issue of culpability. On the contrary, it set in motion years of debate over who bore principal responsibility for the American failure to prepare for the attack.

Roberts and his commission argued that Admiral Kimmel and his army counterpart, General Walter Short, were negligent regarding Pearl Harbor’s defenses and failed to act on serious intelligence identifying the threat posed by Japan’s carrier group. One of the most controversial claims was that Washington did not hold back on sharing enough information to predict Japanese intentions. Due to the classified nature of the cryptographic project codenamed Magic, the report could not discuss American cryptography, nor could it discuss high-level decision-making in Washington before the attacks.

Admiral Kimmel, who had been relieved of command and demoted, testified before the commission but received a hostile reception. It became clear that administration officials had set up the commission to absolve themselves of blame. After the report went to the White House, Kimmel’s request to be reinstated to his command was refused, leaving him in limbo until another investigation could take place.

New Evidence Regarding Magic Intercepts

In 1944, more information surfaced that suggested that Washington had not fully warned Kimmel about the dangers of a Japanese attack. A naval court of inquiry revealed that the federal government knew about a cable from Tokyo to a Japanese spy ring asking for specific ship locations in the harbor. This had not been shared with Kimmel. Additional decrypts acknowledged that the Japanese were planning on giving up on negotiations. This court of inquiry not only exonerated Admiral Kimmel, it also pinned the blame on Admiral Stark for not properly warning the Pacific Fleet.

In 1945-1946, a Joint Congressional Committee uncovered further evidence pointing to Washington’s failure to inform the Pacific Fleet. Right before the attacks began, General George Marshall tried to warn the fleet that a Japanese attack was very likely. However, he sent the message via a commercial telegram which only reached Pacific Fleet headquarters while the bombs were dropping, even though Marshall had a specialized telephone that could enable him to speak with Kimmel securely. When the Committee published its full report in 1946, it severely undermined the initial claim that Kimmel and General Short had been negligent in their duties.

One of the main reasons that the initial investigation could not publicize so much information regarding Allied intelligence of Japanese plans was that Magic had not been declassified yet. Magic was a US signals intelligence program that cracked Japanese codes. Initially, only diplomatic ciphers had been cracked; military codes would be broken later in the war. However, the Americans still had significant information warning that an attack was very likely. Because Kimmel was not aware of the full extent of American codebreaking activities, he was kept out of the loop regarding detailed intelligence sharing.

The Decades-Long Fight for Exoneration

Notwithstanding the findings of this report, Kimmel still struggled to clear his name in the eyes of the public. In the decades after the war, he insisted that the Navy officially acknowledge that it failed him and scapegoated him. In 1955, he wrote a memoir arguing that, had he been given more information, he would not have had the fleet sitting at anchor unprotected. Notwithstanding the revelations made in 1946, the Navy refused to acknowledge its failures. He died in 1968, leading his family to take up the mantle of pushing for accountability.

The admiral’s surviving sons Edward and Thomas Kimmel pushed hard for an apology from the Navy. They, together with grandson Thomas Jr., went to Congress, the Department of Defense, and other governmental bodies to insist on the record being corrected. They had a breakthrough in 1999 when the Senate voted to formally exonerate Kimmel and posthumously restore him to his four-star rank. Provisions were made in an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 2001, but neither the Department of Defense nor successive presidential administrations agreed to do so.

The Pentagon insisted that, while information sharing should have been done more efficiently, Admiral Kimmel still bore responsibility for the disaster as fleet commander. To this day, while most historians believe that he was scapegoated, the military still insists that he was responsible for the security failures. The debate over Admiral Kimmel’s culpability is the longest-running dispute regarding military rank in American history.

When the Cold War began in the aftermath of World War II, there was a desire by the United States and its allies to contain the Communist threat in Europe. Direct military action was off the table due to the strength of the USSR and the development of nuclear weapons. The newly formed Central Intelligence Agency began to carry out covert activity to fight the Eastern Bloc from within. How did this impact the course of the Cold War?

Postwar Eastern Europe and Communist Rule

At the end of the Second World War, one of the first tasks of the Soviet government was to turn the entire area of Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe into a series of Communist buffer states. The communization of Eastern Europe was a major priority of Josef Stalin, who wanted to ensure that no one could invade the Soviet Union again. The Soviet secret police, NKVD (later KGB), had clear policies regarding the people who lived in Eastern Europe—no resistance and dissent was to be tolerated. In a matter of years, local Communist parties took over these Eastern European countries and put an end to free elections.

In the West, people looked on in horror at these developments and there was a clamor to stop the Soviet takeover of large parts of Europe. This marked the start of the Cold War as the United States and its allies were determined to stop the Soviets. The United States faced a conundrum. It wanted to use force to stop any potential westward advance of the Soviets, remembering the failure of appeasement in the 1930s. At the same time, the development of nuclear weapons and their proliferation in the 1950s made a conventional war between the US and USSR all but impossible. The United States and its allies therefore endorsed another way of containing and rolling back Communism: covert actions designed to destabilize the Soviet bloc. This would become one of the main tools used by the US during the Cold War.

Creation of the CIA’s Covert Action Program

When the CIA was founded in 1947, it was designed to collect intelligence in the conventional fashion through espionage. Its responsibilities soon expanded into conducting covert missions using operatives or working with partners in areas the CIA was interested in. In 1948, the Truman administration decided that covert action was needed to combat Soviet control of Eastern Europe. NSC 10/2 ordered the CIA to begin carrying out sabotage, propaganda, and subversive activities against Communist governments.

The Agency’s actions were to take place alongside overt US efforts to undermine Communist rule. Anti-Communist dissidents were to be employed as a medium for CIA activity. In addition to distributing anti-Communist writings known as Samizdat, the CIA hoped to cause mayhem with agents dropped into Eastern Europe. The presence of large numbers of anti-Soviet partisan bands fighting the Red Army at the end of the Cold War gave the CIA reason to believe that they could make Communist rule in Eastern Europe untenable.

With the creation of the Warsaw Pact and the strengthening of Soviet defenses, such tasks became very difficult. In East Germany, the Stasi and KGB cooperated closely, fearing that West German and American spies were everywhere. Elsewhere in the Communist Bloc, the KGB ensured that they were deeply connected with other spy agencies. This was to make US covert actions very difficult. Nonetheless, the US immediately began to undertake covert actions when NSC 10/2 was enacted as official policy.

Early CIA Covert Operations in Eastern Europe

One of the first operations the CIA carried out was Operation Red Sox in 1948, an effort to help the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists who were fighting the Soviet Army. US aircraft parachuted weapons and operatives to Ukrainian nationalist partisans opposed to the USSR. Similarly, in the three Baltic states, the CIA and British MI6 armed and assisted partisan bands known as the Forest Brothers. These fighters had similar motivations to the Ukrainians: to push out the Soviet occupiers. Even though some of these men had fought on the Axis side in World War II, the Western allies were willing to support them in order to undermine Soviet control of Eastern Europe. The CIA’s operation in the Baltics, known as AEGEAN, began in 1949.

Even though the partisan bands in Eastern Europe were battle-hardened, the Soviets had the upper hand. Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, was assassinated by the KGB in 1959 and his partisans struggled to fight on. In the Baltics, the Forest Brothers were heavily outnumbered and outgunned, notwithstanding the CIA’s efforts. The KGB played “radio games,” a deception in which they pretended to be partisans and requested operatives to be dropped to them, leading to their capture or killing. By the mid to late 1950s, the Forest Brothers, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and other like-minded groups had been quashed. The Agency’s initial efforts had been a disaster and Communist rule was more entrenched than it had been in the 1940s.

CIA Covert Activities From the 1960s-1980s

After the failure of its early covert operations, the CIA’s emphasis shifted away from direct action. The expansion of the Cold War meant that the CIA’s Special Activities Division had to begin working around the globe and could not just focus on Europe. Enhanced border security measures in the Eastern Bloc such as the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 made infiltration much harder. Therefore, the CIA dropped the idea of arming major insurgencies behind the Iron Curtain. Instead, the focus turned to getting Communist officials to turn on their own governments and to promote the underground press. Additionally, the CIA set up covert militias in Western Europe in case of a Soviet attack as part of a plan known as Operation Gladio.

In East Germany, the CIA sought to undermine the morale of the Communists through an aggressive information warfare program, which claimed that the USSR was going to sacrifice East Germany in a war with the West. Even though the Stasi and KGB proved to be formidable in rooting out the CIA’s spy networks, the propaganda had an impact as many East Germans tried to flee to the West. The creation of underground newspapers was not a CIA invention, but CIA operatives helped with the distribution and promotion of these outlets.

In 1969, the CIA increased funding for these programs, sensing weakness from within the Soviet bloc. Even though the tactics had evolved, the primary objective remained the same: to weaken Communist rule to the point of collapse.

The CIA and the End of the Cold War

The Agency believed it was gaining success with Albania’s exit from the Warsaw Pact, the Sino-Soviet split, and the attempt by Czechoslovakia to rebel against Communist rule. While the Prague Spring failed, it was a foreshadowing of what was to come. Communist rule, imposed by the USSR on Eastern Europe at gunpoint, had never been popular. As the Soviet economy started to fail, dissidents in Eastern Bloc countries vowed to topple Communist rule once and for all, and the CIA was ready to offer them assistance.

In the 1980s, the Polish trade union known as Solidarity began organizing strikes against the Communist government of Wojciech Jaruzelski. Seeing an opportunity to undermine the entire Warsaw Pact, the Reagan administration began privately assisting Solidarity. In Operation QRHELPFUL, the Agency provided around $20 million to bolster Solidarity’s finances. Unlike the CIA operations in the 1940s and 1950s, this was designed to assist a nonviolent movement.

By 1989, Solidarity had been successful in toppling the Communist regime in Poland. Across Eastern Europe, Communist governments fell: Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. The Berlin Wall came down, paving the road for German reunification. By 1991, the Soviet Union itself dissolved and the former Soviet republics gained independence. The CIA was thrilled but shocked; it had not suspected that the Communist structure was so weak. Its analysts did not think that the USSR and its satellite states would crumble solely due to internal pressure. Even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US thought the Cold War would continue.

Were These Operations Successful?

From its founding in 1947 to the final days of the USSR in 1991, the CIA invested enormous time and resources into combatting Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, a major debate ensued after the Cold War: to what extent was the fall of Communism in Europe the result of American action?

The CIA’s initial efforts at arming anti-Communist groups were based on poor intelligence, underestimating the ruthlessness of the Soviet security services, and a failure to appreciate local realities on the ground. The Soviets and their partners sought to ensure that no-one could undermine their rule. After a little over a decade, it became apparent that covert action needed to change in style if the CIA wanted to have an impact in the region.

While the CIA stopped arming anti-Communist groups in the Warsaw Pact, they found that the masses generally opposed Communist rule. Financing and promoting underground media and literature helped convince people to organize and fight back. The steady outflow of educated people from the Communist bloc undermined the efforts of the Warsaw Pact states to build effective economies. Additionally, the CIA reminded people of what their lives could look like without Communism.

In the end, the CIA’s covert operations in Eastern Europe contributed to the collapse of Communist rule. While their operations started out as a failure, the Agency learned lessons from previous failures and adapted to changing circumstances. It is no wonder that the CIA felt it played a major part in ending the Cold War and its reputation grew out of this success.